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Abstract 
Carbon sequestration is considered as the cost effective way of reducing carbon dioxide 
emission and other greenhouse gases. This study estimated the carbon sequestration cost 
function considering land use change in developing countries. Using the instrumental variable 
method, this study found that the percentage change in the cost due to the percentage change 
in carbon sequestration is almost unitary. The result also shows that the presence of Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) project in a country and per capita GDP in purchasing 
power parity (GDP, ppp) have positive influence on the carbon sequestration cost function. 
The marginal cost calculated from the total cost function representing the unit price of carbon 
dioxide is very low compared with the marginal abatement cost of the developed countries but 
equals the price at the European 2CO emission trading market. 
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Chapter-1:  Introduction 
 
Carbon sequestration is the method by which carbon dioxide ( 2CO ) is captured and stored 
that helps reducing carbon emission in the atmosphere. According to Carbon Finance carbon 
sequestration refers to-, “The process of removing carbon from atmosphere and depositing it 
in a reservoir” (Carbon Finance, 2011, p. 39). World Soil Resources, quoted from Resources 
For the Future (RFF) “Generally refer[ring] to capturing carbon- in a carbon sink, such as 
the oceans, or a terrestrial sink such as forests or soils - so as to keep the carbon out of the 
atmosphere”(World Soil Resources Report-92, 2000, p. 8). 
It is an alternative way of reducing carbon dioxide emission reduction and can be a 
component of emission trading approach where greenhouse gas emissions are capped and 
then used to allocate the emissions among the group of regulated sources. Carbon 
sequestration helps to achieve the goal of emission reduction in a cost effective way through 
the carbon market mechanisms. The carbon market mechanism drives industrial and 
commercial processes in the direction of low emissions or less carbon intensive approaches 
comparing to “business as usual” emission into the atmosphere. There are three methods used 
for carbon reduction into the atmosphere; efficiency and conservation, carbon-free and 
reduced carbon energy sources and carbon capture and sequestration (TEEIC, 2012). By using 
efficiency and conservation energy reduces carbon emission. The carbon free and reduced 
carbon energy includes the solar power, wind power, geothermal and nuclear power. Finally, 
carbon capture and sequestration which involves capturing and storing carbon dioxide within 
plants and soil (TEEIC, 2012). 
Carbon sequestration depends on some driving factors like land use and land use change. It is 
expected to be increased positively with the expansion of size of the forest land. Since carbon 
sequestration/Green House Gas (GHG) mitigation projects generate credits, this approach can 
be used to finance in the carbon sequestration projects between trading partners around the 
world. This is explained in article 12 of Kyoto Protocol where Annex I countries can earn 
credits by investing emission reduction projects in developing countries to meet domestic 
GHG emission quotas through Clean Development Mechanism (Bloomfield and Pearson, 
2000). At present many companies are involved in the sale of carbon credits to commercials 
and individuals who are willing to lower their carbon footprint at voluntary basis. The carbon 
off-setters can purchase the credits from an investment fund or a carbon development 
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company that aggregates the credits from individual projects.  An exchange platform is used 
to trade by the parties, such as the Carbon Trade Exchange which is similar to a stock 
exchange for carbon credits or European Emission Trading System (EUETS). The quality of 
the credits is based on the validation process and sophistication of the fund or development 
company that acted as the sponsor to the carbon project. This sponsorship is reflected in the 
carbon price while voluntary units with lower price and the units sold through the rigorously 
validated Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) (Hay et al. 2007) with higher price.  
By the Kyoto Protocol (1997), the industrialized countries (Annex I) set a goal of reducing 
2CO  by 2010.  To achieve that target they have to reduce on an average 5.2%  (based on the 
measurement of the year 1990) of their overall GHG emission within the period of 2008 to 
2012.  On the other side no mandatory obligation was set for Non-Annex I countries (Kapoor 
and Ambrosi, 2006). At present 39 developed countries which need to reduce their carbon 
emission because of high growth and emission level (Smith and Scherr, 2002). But the 
reduction of emission is costly to developed countries. In contrast, developing countries (Non-
Annex I) having no reduction target can reduce 2CO  emission with lower cost through carbon 
sequestration in their terrestrial forest lands. As a result, carbon sequestration in developing 
countries decreases the cost of emission reduction for developed countries and generates an 
extra source of foreign earnings for them (Ellerman et al, 1998). Thus the cost of carbon 
sequestration has importance to achieve the goal of emission reduction and to the investors 
(land owners) for profitability. Many studies argue that the forest based carbon sequestration 
is cost effective but if the indirect costs of the carbon sequestration are calculated then the 
carbon price is little bit lower compared to the abatement cost of carbon by countries 
mentioned in Annex I (Ellerman et al, 1998). 
The concept of carbon sequestration is a result of increasing awareness of the need for 
controlling emissions. The IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) has observed 
that global temperature increases due to emission of GHGs and thus concentration of GHGs 
in the atmosphere needs to be stabilized to protect global disasters. Considering this issue 
UNFCCC has assigned and adopted a protocol named ‘The Kyoto Protocol’ on 11 December 
1997 in Kyoto, Japan though the protocol came to effect on 16 February 2005. Till September 
2011 almost 191 countries have signed and ratified the protocol but USA is the only country 
which did not ratify the protocol yet (UNFCCC). 
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All Annex I member countries (37) who have signed and ratified the Kyoto Protocol come to 
a consensus that they have to reduce GHGs and accordingly they decided to reduce four 
GHGs (carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, sulphur hexafluoride) and two groups of 
gases (hydro fluorocarbons and per fluorocarbons). At negotiations, Annex I countries 
(including the USA) collectively agreed to reduce their GHGs emission by 5.2% on average 
from the year 2008 until 2012. Measurement and calculation of emission reduction will be 
based on the annual emission of the year 1990, which has been recognized as the base year. 
Since the USA has not ratified the protocol, the collective emission reduction (from the 
standard of the year 1990) target of 5.2% declined to 4.2% (IPCC). 
Though the protocol has emphasized to reduce the GHGs but simultaneously it allows some 
‘flexible mechanisms’, includes emission trading, the CDM and Joint Implementation (JI) 
which are now known as carbon market. These mechanisms create opportunity for Annex I 
countries to meet their GHGs emission limit through purchase reduction credits from 
elsewhere in the world. The methods of purchasing GHGs include financial exchanges, 
projects which reduce emission in non-Annex I countries and from Annex I countries with 
excess credit allowances. The ultimate goal of these flexible mechanisms defined under the 
Kyoto Protocol was to lower the overall costs of achieving its emission targets. These 
mechanisms enable parties to achieve emission reduction or to remove carbon from the 
atmosphere cost-effectively in other countries. While the cost of limiting emission varies 
considerably from region to region, the benefit for the atmosphere is in principle the same, 
wherever the action is taken (UNFCCC, Market Mechanism under Kyoto Protocol). As a 
result, projects for carbon sequestration were encouraged in Non-Annex I countries and using  
this flexible mechanisms Annex I countries can reduce emission by trading from developing 
countries that are lesser emission or has the carbon stored in forests areas.  
For carbon trading, developing countries are considered to receive credits from developed 
countries under flexible mechanisms which are helpful for carbon sequestration. But after 
Cop 6 and Cop 7, increased range and scale of forestry and land uses have changed credit 
system of Annex I countries which reduced the availability of credit to developing countries 
and decreased their benefits of emission trading. As a result, it declined the standard of 
livelihood by increasing regulatory costs of investment in rural areas in developing countries 
(Bettelheim and Origny, 2002). Thus the cost of carbon sequestration has influential effects 
on land use change in favor of carbon sequestration in developing countries. Usually, a 
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country (in practice farmers or landowners) will use its land for carbon sequestration if it 
finds the sequestration less costly. It will also consider the unit price of carbon to be high 
enough to supply more carbon sequestration. In contrast, as buyer, developed countries will 
look for carbon reduction through sequestration if it is less costly or cheaper comparing the 
other means of reduction or abatement costs. Thus the cost of carbon sequestration is very 
important to combat the climate change effect caused by carbon dioxide emission. 
The purpose of this study is thus to estimate the carbon sequestration cost function for 
developing countries as it may plays a vital role in climate change policy. Since the tropical 
forest can be used as the sink of carbon sequestration, this study will consider the LUC (Land 
Use Changes) pattern on carbon sequestration in estimating the cost function. 
 
The global concern for reducing carbon emission has enhanced the carbon sequestration as a 
cost effective measure. Though it is assumed as a cost effective measure but how effective it 
is? Is it a profitable sector to the landowners? And does this carbon sequestration effectively 
benefit the developing countries as supplier countries? To get answers of these questions we 
need to know the nature of carbon sequestration cost function. As a result, this thesis is 
intended to estimate the carbon sequestration cost function for developing countries so that 
we could know the merits and demerits of carbon sequestration which hopefully can combat 
negative effects of climate change. While estimating the carbon sequestration cost function 
this study used data on a sample of 58 countries from different sources.  
The remaining of this study is organized as follows. In chapter 2, relevent literatures are  
reviewed, chapter 3 demonstrates the theoretical background of the thesis, chapter 4 consists 
of the determinants of the cost of carbon sequestration, chapter 5 covers the data sourecs and 
analysis, chapter 6 focuses on the econmetric models and results with different hypothesis 
tests, chapter 7 discusses the comparison of the results and findings with previous estimates 
and current market scenario, and final section has included a concluding remark. 
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Chapter-2: Literature Review 
 
 
Many previous studies have analyzed the carbon sequestration function as a cost effective 
method of emission reduction. For the purpose of this thesis some of the important studies are 
reviewed. 
 
Bloomfield and Pearson (2000) have argued that the land use, land use change of reducing 
deforestation rate, increasing land to forest plantations, reforestation, agro forestry, improving 
the management of forests and agricultural areas can help reduction of GHG emission by 
increasing carbon storage. They have indicated productive capacity of land, financial 
consideration of the land owners and environmental concern as determinants of land use 
decisions. In contrast, for carbon benefit they have stated that it would be either increasing 
carbon storage or use of wood as bio fuel. In this paper they have examined various options 
and trade-off that the developing countries face in using land use and land use change 
activities. The options they considered are reforestation, plantation, agro-forestry and halting 
deforestation from different previous studies. Then they have analyzed the existing estimates 
of offset potential and assessed how realistic those estimates were according to the constraints 
and driving factors. Their study based on the eight previous studies on regional and country-
level estimates of land use and land use change offset potential. The regions cover Africa, 
Asia and tropical America particular emphasis on tropical Non-Annex I countries were 
discussed in all studies. Above and below ground biomass and soil, soil and fossil fuel offset 
were considered as carbon pools whereas, reforestation, plantation, agro-forestry, improved 
management of cultivable land and production of energy crops were activities. In case of 
reforestation offset potential varies from minimum 5.7 billion ton to maximum 12-29 billion 
ton per year, offset potential for slowing deforestation ranges from minimum 4.5 billion ton to 
maximum 11-21 billion ton per year, plantation ranges from min 2-5 billion ton to maximum 
16.4 billion ton, improved management of cultivated land and energy crops 0.2-0.7 billion ton 
per year. 
 
Stavins (1999) has discussed the revealed preference method using econometric model for 
estimating carbon sequestration cost function. He tried to address each problem for why land 
owners’ behavior is not well predicted in engineering or least cost methods. The problems he 
suggested are i) irreversible investment due to uncertainty make the option values important 
in land use changes; ii) forest land may have non-pecuniary returns  to the land owners; iii) 
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decision making inertia; and iv) probability of market benefit or cost of alternative land uses. 
Then, he intended to focus on econometric analyses of land use for getting an estimate of 
marginal cost of carbon sequestration. Using panel data for 36 counties of Arkansas, 
Louisiana and Mississippi of USA from 1935 to 1984, he estimated the parameters with non-
linear least squares estimators. He then found that marginal costs of carbon sequestration 
increases gradually until it reaches $66 per ton of carbon where carbon sequestration reaches 
7 million ton above the baseline sequestration 4.6 million ton. He also noticed that the 
marginal cost follows a linear trend. The same result also has obtained by Newell and Stavins 
(1999). They estimated the marginal cost of carbon sequestration observing land owners’ 
behavior using engineering or least cost approaches. They found that the cost of carbon 
sequestration can be greater if the trees are harvested periodically rather than permanently; 
higher discount rate imply a higher marginal cost; higher agricultural price leads higher 
marginal cost or reduces sequestration and slow downed deforestation can sequester carbon at 
lower cost than reforestation. In a recent study on cost of USA carbon sequestration, Stavins 
and Richards (2005) have shown that the cost of per ton of 2CO  ranges from $7.5 to $22.5 
while it ranges from $30 to $90 in an extensive program. 
 
A comparison of studies of USA Energy Information Administration (EIA) found that in 2020 
cost of last ton of carbon is $52 if it is reduced in the USA and it is only $31.75 if reduction 
comes from global market (Kopp, 2011). But global attempt can reduce the cost significantly 
which is shown by a recent study that 100-125 million tons of deforestation based carbon 
emission can be reduced at the rate of $10 (cited by Kopp, 2011).  
 
In an early study Moulton and Richards (1990) worked on costs of carbon sequestration 
through plantation and forest management in the United States. Using a very simple economic 
model (bottom-up-engineering) they estimated the cost of sequestration on land and planting 
costs though the carbon sequestration for hypothetical carbon sequestration program was 
calculated on available land and forest carbon accumulation rate.  They found that the cost of 
carbon sequestration ranges from $5.26 to $43.33 per ton. They cautiously suggested that 
forestland and marginal pastureland are least costly opportunities for carbon sequestration. 
But sometimes carbon sequestration projects can increase the prices of the agricultural land 
and it can lead the land owners to convert part of unregulated forests to agriculture, which 
offsets some of the carbon sequestration. 
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Richards and Stokes (2004) critically reviewed several studies on carbon sequestration costs. 
They found that the cost of carbon sequestration ranges from $10 to $150 per ton of carbon 
sequestration. This cost is consistent a sequestration of 250 to 500 million tons in the USA 
and more than 2000 tons carbon globally. They reviewed that the cost of carbon sequestration 
varies across regions and within a region it varies across studies due to different methods of 
calculation. 
 
Pfaff and Kerr (1999) and Pfaff et al. (2000) assessed the carbon sequestration and its cost 
function. They defined a carbon sequestration supply function or marginal cost of carbon 
sequestration in Costa Rica as a relationship between a monetary carbon reward and carbon 
sequestration supplied by the landowners. They used existing Global Information System 
(GIS) data on land use and land cover and other factors affecting the land use choices. They 
used three types of modeling such as advance process-based modeling which is known as 
CENTURY Model for simulation of Carbon (C) and Nitrogen (N) dynamics which reflects 
carbon to nitrogen activity in soil sample, advance empirically-based modeling for carbon 
storage where they used advance adaptation of life zone type modeling for predicting carbon 
storage and finally advance observationally-based economic modeling of land cover (GIS 
projection). In economic modeling, they considered the landowners to solve a dynamic 
optimization problem where the landowners seek to earn the greatest returns from the land 
uses. The return also depends on land characteristics, present and past land use, price and 
yields of different crops, cost of production and access to market, cost of changing land use, 
and expected future values of these factors. Depending on their theoretical model they derived 
empirical/econometric models which focused the effects of key observable factors in the 
estimation process. In estimation they used both the traditional approach and more dynamic 
approach.  
 
Makundi  and Okiting’ati (1995) estimated carbon emissions from Tanzanian forest sector, 
evaluated response options in the forestry sector with cost and benefit approach and discussed 
various options and barriers. By using the COPATH Model they showed that plantation in 
1990 deforested area can provide 0.26 million ton of carbon if it is prompt uptake and 7.05 
million ton in delayed uptake. For estimating cost, they used factor input obtained from 
Makundi (1979) and Swedeforest Consulting AB. In conservation option, they found that per 
ton of carbon costs $1.27 on average in different conservation forests while carbon from 
avoiding deforestation costs $1.06 to $ 3.4 per ton at 0% discount rate. At 10% discount rate 
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they found the eucalyptus and maize option has the highest net present value with $1.73 per 
ton and government plantation gives negative net present value of $0.13 per ton of carbon 
sequestered. Finally, they argued that Tanzania has a cost effective GHG mitigation 
opportunities in the global level. 
 
Masera et al. (1995) studied the economic response options to avoid carbon emission and 
increase carbon sequestration in the forests in Mexico. They examined the carbon 
sequestration and its cost in three policy scenario in the years 2000, 2010 and 2030. For these 
policy scenarios, they used benefit-cost analysis. They performed the study using available 
primary information on benefit, cost and other carbon related parameters. They observed the 
unit establishment cost in carbon sequestration is $0.3 to $14 per ton of carbon in all scenarios 
where yearly estimated carbon sequestration is 115 million ton. Calculating the benefit-cost 
analysis with 10% discount rate they found that option results in low net benefit equated $58 
per hectare. In conclusion, they suggested that Mexican forest has potentials to carbon 
sequestration as it is profitable.  
 
Ravindranath and Somashekhar (1995) studied India’s carbon emission from forestry sector, 
estimated the potentials for carbon sequestration and considered financial analysis of forestry 
option. For carbon sequestration under forestry option they considered maximizing Net 
Present Value (NPV) of economic benefit of per ton of carbon sequestration. For conducting 
this NPV approach, they stated that the investment cost in per ton of carbon sequestration for 
Natural Regeneration (NR) forest is $1.5, in Afforestation (AF) is $1.6 per ton of carbon, 
Enhanced Natural Regeneration (ENR) $2.5 per ton, Timber Forest $ 3.3 per ton of carbon, 
Community Woodlot (CW) $5.6 per ton and in Soft Wood Forestry (SWF) is $7.3 per ton of 
carbon. They also compared the forestry options with different energy options and found that 
the investment cost in per ton of carbon sequestration is very low in all forestry options.  
 
Brown (1996) noted that unit cost of reducing carbon by decreasing deforestation through 
protecting forest tend to be lower and it ranges from $1 - $6 per ton of carbon in most tropical 
countries because of  high carbon density (50-100 ton per hectare). She also mentioned that 
the cost of sequestration will be increasing if opportunity cost of using, planting and 
maintaining land is considered. In addition, she reported from recent studies that costs range 
in $2 - $20 per ton of carbon. She also mentioned the variation across different regions. For 
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example in India per ton of carbon sequestration costs $3 - $9 and in Thailand it costs $13 - 
$26. 
 
The opportunity of earnings from the carbon market in developing countries was discussed in 
a report by McDowell (2002). He argued that rural communities in the world’s poorest 
nations will be able to earn income by using their forests and agricultural land to sequester 
carbon dioxide under a plan announced by the World Bank. The announcement will help bio-
carbon fund to allow companies and public sector organizations in the developed world to 
offset some of their carbon emission in the projects in developing world, such as tree planting 
schemes which absorb carbon from the atmosphere. 
 
The benefits that developing countries can derive from carbon sequestration were discussed in 
Niles et al. (2002). They pointed out that 47 tropical and sub-tropical developing countries 
have the potential to reduce carbon burden by about 2.3 billion tons of carbon in the next 10 
years. Calculating carbon sequestration they used carbon uptake potential for non-commercial 
planting while the data they used for areas of land could be reforested with natural and 
assisted regeneration from secondary sources. Then the areas have been multiplied by the 
carbon accumulation rates ranging from 0.5 to 2.5 ton of carbon per hectare for dry tropical 
area and 2.5 to 5.0 per ton for humid tropical areas. These accumulation rates they used were 
collected from appropriate case studies and from country’s general climatic profile. To avoid 
difficulties and likely monitoring verification, they used the lower end of the range for all 
countries in estimating carbon sequestration. For sustainable agriculture practice, they used 
Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) statistical data on area and carbon potentials from 
secondary source of more than 200 agricultural projects. Finally for avoiding deforestation 
they multiplied the most recent deforestation rate by area weighted carbon stock. They have 
shown that a given price of $10 per ton of carbon and 3% discount rate will generate $16.8 
billion earnings collectively for those countries. 
 
Therefore, carbon sequestration and estimation of carbon sequestration cost function has 
much importance in the context of developing countries. There are many measures that can be 
used to estimate the carbon sequestration cost function or supply function. Irrespective of 
econometric model, a most used measure of estimating this supply function or cost curve is 
bottom-up engineering cost analyses or optimization model where marginal costs are 
constructed by the use of information of revenues and costs of production of alternative land 
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uses on representative types or locations of land, and sorting these in ascending order of cost 
(Lubowski et al., 2006). 
 
The reviewed literatures have provided opportunity to focus on carbon sequestration 
potentials, carbon accumulation rate in various options, carbon sequestration cost and benefit 
of carbon sequestration in different developing countries. The studies discussed in the 
literature review part have focused estimation of carbon sequestration cost either only one 
country or some regions of a country. None of the studies is found to estimate the carbon 
sequestration cost function in global perspective. This study has concentrated in estimating 
carbon sequestration cost function globally. On the other hand, some of the literatures proved 
that the carbon sequestration is less costly in some countries. So another goal of this study is 
to estimate and examine how cost effective it is. Unexpectedly none of the studies has focused 
on the responsiveness of carbon sequestration cost function which has a serious implication 
on the reduction of carbon emission in the ground. So this study has tackled the issue of the 
responsiveness of the carbon sequestration cost with respect to carbon sequestration. The 
future of emission reduction target through carbon sequestration depends on the cost of 
carbon sequestration. If the sequestration is less costly, then many countries will come ahead 
in carbon sequestration. As a result, estimating carbon sequestration cost function is more 
significant in combating climate change effects.  
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Chapter-3: Theoretical Background 
 
Let us consider the total land supply ,0A which the land owner can use in conventional 
agriculture or in carbon sequestration. It is assumed that every land owner is profit motivated. 
So, given the available land, they will decide how much land to use in conventional 
agriculture and for carbon sequestration while the total supply of land is fixed. Then, the 
objective function of a firm or land owner is to maximize the following profit function (Π) 
subject to total supply of available land (𝐴0). 
Max )()()()( SSQQSSQQ ACACASPAQP −−+=∏ ----------------------------------- -- -----(1) 
Subject to  0AAA
SQ ≤+     ------------------------------------------------------------- ---- --------(2) 
 
Here ∏ = Profit of a land owner,   Q = Quantity of output from agricultural or any other 
land used sectors, S  = Total quantity of sequestered carbon,  QP  = Price of agricultural 
output, SP = Price of carbon, QA = Land uses in agricultural sector, SA = Land uses in carbon 
sequestration sector, QC = Cost of land uses for output production, SC = Cost of land uses for 
carbon sequestration.  
 
For profit maximization, marginal net returns of land use in both sectors (agriculture and 
carbon sequestration) need to be equal, which is necessary condition i.e. First Order Condition 
(FOC) derived from the Lagrangian, 
Max [ ]SQSSQQSSQQ AAAACACASPAQPL −−+−−+= 0)()()()( λ  ---------------------(3) 
),{ SQ AA  
 Here L = Lagrangian profit function, 𝜆 = Lagrangian multiplier; shadow price/ cost of land 
uses. So, the FOCs for profit maximization are, 
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∂
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From equation 4 and 5 we get,    
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SQ AA ∏=∏=λ --------------------------------------------------------------------------(8) 
Here 
q
A AQ ∂
∏∂
=∏  refers marginal return of land used in agriculture sector and
s
A AS ∂
∏∂
=∏  
refers marginal return of land used in carbon sequestration sector. That is any firm or 
landowner will allocate his/her land use in agriculture and in carbon sequestration project in 
such a way that the marginal net return/profit is equal to 𝜆  in both sectors. This condition is 
illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
 
                                    
 
 
             QA∂
∂π          SA∂
∂π   
                      t                        n        
                                                                  e                                                                                                                         
𝜆                   
             k                        l             
      
             0                A**        A*       A***              0′ 
       
 𝑨𝑸                            𝑨𝑺 
                                                                
                                                           𝑨𝟎 
             Figure 1: Optimal Allocation of Land Use 
 
Optimal condition for land use: λ=
∂
∏∂
=
∂
∏∂
SQ AA
 
The optimal allocation for land use became very important after the world faces the 
incremental pressure of population increase. Generally speaking increased population needs 
food and energy which indeed requires changes in the systematic use of land and ultimately 
leads to pressure on land use. In contrast, to mitigate global climate change affects the 
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concern of limiting carbon emission demand has intended to increase the demand for land use 
for carbon sequestration projects. In these circumstances, change of a cultivable land to forest 
land for carbon sequestration would be optimal if the following condition holds;  𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝐴𝑄
= 𝜕𝜆𝜋
𝜕𝐴𝑠
=  𝜆  which is the optimal condition for land use. 
 
In the above Figure 1,  A* is the optimal allocation of land where 0A* units of land (=𝐴𝑄 ) is 
allocated for conventional agricultural sector and 0′𝐴* units of land (= 𝐴𝑆) is allocated for 
carbon sequestration with equal net marginal benefit which is in turn equal to shadow price 
(=𝜆 ). If land use increases in favor of conventional agriculture, say for example 0A* to 
0A***, then the marginal benefit from agricultural sector will increase by area **** elAA . 
On the other hand land use reduction in carbon sequestration sector will decrease the marginal 
benefit by about the area **** enAA . As a result, the land owner or the farm will be worse 
off by the area enl  which a social loss. Thus a profit motivated investor or land owner will 
allocate the land use in such a way that the marginal benefits from both sectors are equal to 
each other. The same result may happen if the land use increases in favor of carbon 
sequestration. In that case, the land owner will experience a loss of marginal benefit from 
agriculture sector amounting to the area etk . So, carbon sequestration will be enhanced if the 
marginal net benefit of land use in carbon sequestration is larger than marginal net benefit of 
land use in agriculture sector. The cost of carbon sequestration is thus the net forgone profits 
from agriculture and increased marginal profits from carbon sequestration.  
 
In order to estimate supply or demand function for carbon sequestration we need data on price 
of carbon sequestration either from demand side or from supply side and data on prices of 
agricultural output. Unfortunately, in the data section we did not find data on carbon prices as 
carbon sequestration is a new phenomenon in the global economy. In this regard, this study 
concentrates on estimating the carbon sequestration cost function for developing countries 
assuming that the cost function is based on profit maximizing behaviors presented in this 
section. That is, the carbon sequestration costs will not be undertaken unless they cover 
opportunity cost of the land. Therefore, we have ignored the cost for producing conventional 
agricultural products. The focus of this study is only on carbon sequestration cost 
(responsiveness) function for developing countries 
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Chapter-4: Determinants of the Cost of Land Use for Carbon Sequestration 
 
The cost of carbon sequestration mainly depends on the opportunity cost of land, costs of 
maintenance, transaction and plantation. Forest Carbon Index (FCI, 2009) has concluded that 
except the opportunity cost of land the other costs are negligible and it considered other costs 
in transaction cost (growing and protecting a forest, human labor cost and machinery) which 
is estimated only 13 % of the project cost. 
 
In addition, the cost function has some exogenous determinants like Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) projects and Per-Capita GDP (in PPP). If there is a CDM project in a 
country it will affect the cost of carbon sequestration. Furthermore, if the per capita GDP 
increases in a country it means that more land is used in favor of other sectors. In that case 
land use in favor of carbon sequestration will be more costly. In all the cases the costs exceed 
the benefit of land use for carbon sequestration which is shown in Figure 1. 
 
The carbon sequestration cost function depends on land use changes like 
afforestation/reforestation, sustainable agricultural practice, deforestation halted and size of 
forest area. Thus, the change of these affects the carbon sequestration through changing land 
use and thus the cost of carbon sequestration. If any changes of these determinants increase 
the quantity of sequestrated carbon, it will increase the cost (shown above in Figure 1, 
reducing the benefit of other cultivation). These variables work as instrument in the carbon 
sequestration which in turn affects the cost function. 
 
The more the afforestation/reforestation takes place, the more land is distributed in favor of 
carbon sequestration increasing the opportunity cost of land. The tropical countries are 
feasible for afforestation (Rokityanskiy et al, 2007) which is better than the mature forest in 
terms of carbon sequestration as plantation accumulates higher rate of carbon sequestration 
(Bloomfield and Pearson, 2000). If the reforestation rate increases it will increase the cost of 
sequestration. On average 33-44% of the reduction (carbon reduction) could be met cost 
effectively through forest-based sequestration (Sedjo et. al., 2001). 
 
Deforestation is considered as the second largest source of anthropogenic carbon dioxide 
emission after fossil fuel and the estimates is about 12% of global emission (Werf et al. 2010). 
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Reduction of deforestation and degraded forests is an important source of carbon emission 
reduction by increasing sequestration. Avoiding deforestation has some other indirect benefits 
like bio-diversity, water and air quality and maintenance of local climate (Bloomfield and 
Pearson, 2000). The USEIA emphasized it as cost effective measure as deforestation is 
responsible for 18-25% of global GHG emission (Kopp, 2011). In order to avoid deforestation 
land owner needs to be compensated as they have the opportunity to produce other 
commodity in their land which also increase the cost of carbon sequestration. Presently, many 
private organizations like NGOs have started carbon sequestration projects like Reducing 
Emission from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD) in some developing countries. REDD 
project is a market based (generate tradable carbon permit) and fund based (developing 
countries receive cash payments) incentive payments to the developing countries for 
promoting not to do deforestation and degradation. Private companies, NGOs and national 
governments are taking REDD project in different developing countries for carbon 
sequestration through reducing deforestation (Ecomagazine, 2012, web).  So, reducing 
deforestation is a key determinant of carbon sequestration through changing land which in 
turn affects the cost of carbon sequestration. 
 
Conventional agriculture system is claimed to be an important source of carbon emission. 
Small firm size and use of pumps in agricultural sector are mainly responsible for carbon 
dioxide emission which is very common in Sub-Saharan African countries using pumps for 
irrigation emitting carbon. But energy efficient small scale pumps can reduce farmers running 
costs and keep carbon dioxide emission at low rate (Sugden, 2010). In Ireland agriculture 
represents 29.1% of total national GHG emissions. National emission reduction target by 
2020 in the ‘Climate Change Response Bill’ emphasizes 30% emission reduction in 
agricultural sector so that the indigenous industry (agriculture) has the sustainable 
development (Schulte and Lanigan, 2011). So, sustainable agricultural practice is an indicator 
of land use which can affect the carbon sequestration in the developing countries. This 
agricultural system is defined as a management system for renewable natural resources that 
provides food, income, and livelihood for present and future generations, and which 
ultimately will maintain/improve the economic productivity and ecosystem services of these 
resources (Blumentha, 2012, web).  In all the developing countries and (or) underdeveloped 
countries agriculture is an important sector because of their dependence on agriculture for 
supplying food for the huge population. As a result, unmanaged and unplanned agricultural 
practice is continuing with social and ritual tradition. Though some times the sustainable 
  16 
 
 
agriculture comes as contradictory with the values of the farmers but it is increasing for the 
last few years (Blumentha, 2012, web). New farming system like agro-forestry, alley and 
multiple cropping could be the good practice of sustainable agriculture and it is more 
profitable and environmental friendly than traditional agriculture. Agro-forestry is found more 
profitable than shifting cultivation (a traditional cultivation in the hilly areas) while shifting 
cultivation is responsible for carbon emission. It needs new land to prepare in rotation basis 
by firing the hilly forest lands to convert in cultivable land for food production (Hossain et al., 
2006). Conversely, sustainable agriculture practice can help in reduction of forest land 
conversion into cultivable land using the existing agricultural land effectively and pasture 
along with reduction of greenhouse gas emission (Bloomfield and Pearson, 1999). Thus, the 
opportunities arise for increasing carbon sequestration on sustainable land use in agricultural 
sector.  
 
Forest area is another important determinant of carbon sequestration. If the size of a forest 
increases it will increase carbon sequestration. Sedjo and Solomon (1998) emphasized 
expanding forest areas to offset world’s carbon sequestration (cited from Richards and Stokes, 
2004). As forest is considered as the sink of carbon sequestration thus it is expected that the 
area of forest is proportionately related to the carbon sequestration. That is the more the sink 
increases the more the sequestration increases. 
 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is the flexible mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol 
by which the Annex I countries are funding projects in the developing countries for carbon 
sequestration. The presence of a CDM project in a country will affect the cost function as an 
exogenous variable as it needs land distribution in favor of the project reducing the other 
cultivation sectors. In many developing countries CDM projects are working on commercial 
basis for supplying carbon credits to the developed countries. At present, almost 7912 active 
CDM projects are in the pipeline in different countries. Among the CDM projects, top 20 
buyer companies are funding 2665 projects in the different part of the globe (UNEP Riso 
Centre, 2012). According to UNFCCC, “CDM allows emission reduction projects in 
developing countries to earn certified emission reduction (CER) credit, each equivalent to 
one ton of 2CO . These CERs can be traded or sold and be used by industrialized countries to 
meet a part of their emission reduction targets under Kyoto Protocol” (UNFCCC, 2012, 
web).  As CDM projects are initiated for carbon sequestration in the developing countries by 
the industrialized developed countries, the presence of a CDM projects in a developing 
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country means that it uses land for project which will increase the cost of carbon 
sequestration. 
 
Per Capita GDP (in PPP) is the indicator of economic growth and development and hence an 
indicator of carbon dioxide emission by Kaya Identity (1990) which is an equation that 
determines the carbon dioxide emission by population or by a country. This formula 
calculates the carbon dioxide emission as a product of population, per capita GDP, energy use 
of per unit of GDP and carbon emission in per unit of energy consumed (The Dictionary of 
Sustainable Management, 2012). Thus Per Capita GDP is an exogenous variable in carbon 
sequestration cost function. Economic growth and emission are positively related. Higher 
economic growth relates to higher emission and lower economic growth relates to the lower 
emission. But lower emission also indicates emission reduction as well. Most of the 
developing countries are agro-based and less industrialized. As a result, accelerating higher 
Per Capita GDP means higher production, more emission and more use of land in other 
cultivation sectors rather than carbon sequestration. As per capita GDP increases the 
opportunity cost of land use will increase in carbon sequestration, which affects the cost 
function. So, if the per capita GDP increases in the developing countries, it will increase the 
cost of carbon sequestration and thereby leading to less sequestration. 
 
 Now the discussion above indicates the selection of the independent variables for the carbon 
sequestration cost function. Total Cost (TC) of carbon sequestration is the dependent variable. 
The independent variables are Carbon Sequestration Supply (CSS), presence of Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) projects, GDP (in PPP). In addition the CSS function also 
depends on some land use behavior like Deforestation Halts (DH), 
Afforestation/Reforestation (AF/RF), Sustainable Agricultural Practice (SAP) and Forest 
Area (FA) respectively. 
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Chapter-5: Data Sources and Analysis 
 
The data used in this study is obtained from secondary sources. Considering the availability of 
data, my sample contains 58 developing countries (Appendix A). The data for different 
variables are collected from different sources like Niles et al., (2002), FAO, UN Data, CDM 
Pipeline, World Bank and some published journals. Details can be consulted in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Variables and Data Sources 
Name of Variable Data Source Variable Type 
Total Cost (million USD) Deveny et al., (Forest Carbon Index 
2009) 
Dependent 
Carbon Sequestration (million 
ton) 
Niles et al., (2002) 
Deveny et al., (Forest Carbon Index 
2009) 
Independent 
Afforestation/ Reforestation 
Rate ( 1000 ha) 
Niles et al., (2002) & FAO Forest 
Data 
Independent 
Deforestation Halts 
(1000 ha) 
Niles et al., (2002) Independent 
Sustainable Agriculture 
Practice (1000 ha) 
Niles et al., (2002) Independent 
Forest Area (1000 ha) UN data (2007) Independent 
CDM (1=yes, 0= otherwise) CDM Pipeline, UNEP Riso Centre Independent 
Per capita GDP, PPP (Current 
International Dollar) 
World Bank’s Data Bank Independent 
Note: Data compiled from different sources.  
 
Total cost of carbon is simply calculated by multiplying the Average Unit Cost (AUC) of 
carbon by Sequestered Quantity of Carbon (S) i.e. TC = AUC*S. Average unit cost is 
presented in USD per ton carbon in Forest Carbon Index (FCI), 2009 (Deveny et al. 2009). 
FCI (2009) has calculated the cost for one ton of carbon sequestration in different developing 
countries. For calculating the cost it considered the opportunity cost of land that is total 
forgone future revenue of agriculture and timber. With different discount rate in different 
regions of the world they calculated the opportunity cost for next 100 years. For this thesis, 
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the average unit cost is chosen from their cost calculation which is then used to find total cost 
of carbon sequestration. Missing average unit cost for some countries were calculated taking 
the average or equivalent to the neighboring countries (Appendix B). 
 
Carbon Sequestration data is collected from Niles et al. (2002). The estimates of carbon 
sequestration from different land uses are then added to get the total sequestration (from 
reforestation, deforestation halted and sustainable agriculture practice) where they have 
estimated the carbon sequestration for each activities separately. The data was accounted for a 
period of 2003-2012 in million tons of carbon. In their work Niles et al., (2002) considered 
only 47 countries but here I considered 58 countries using their original data sheet. The 
missing data for eight countries (Appendix C) out of eleven more countries I used in my 
sample were collected from Devney et al. (FCI, 2009) as proxy and remaining three countries 
data from the original data sheet of Niles et al., (2002).  
 
Reforestation/afforestation rate is jointly collected from Niles et al. (2002) and FAO forest 
data. Niles et al. (2002) is the main source of this data and the missing data for some countries 
(Appendix C) were collected from FAO data. In FAO data for some countries afforestation 
and reforestation data is jointly used as in some countries reforestation was not available and 
thus the term afforestation and reforestation is used interchangeably. This data is used 1000 
ha per year in a country. 
 
Deforestation halted data is also expressed in 1000 ha per year which is used from Niles et al. 
(2002). Deforestation halted means how much deforestation is reducing in a country in a year. 
 
In addition sustainable agricultural practice expressed in million ha per year is also collected 
from Niles et al. (2002). The rate of sustainable practice means how much area is under 
sustainable agricultural practice in a country in a year. 
 
Forest area data is collected from UN data (2007) which is expressed in 1000 ha. 
 
The CDM project data is collected from CDM Pipelines under UNEP Riso Centre (March, 
2012). Finally the Per Capita GDP, PPP is used from World Bank (2005) data. This data is 
expressed in current international dollar. The current international dollar also known as 
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Geary-Khamis dollar that is widely used in economics which is a hypothetical dollar having 
same purchasing power like the US dollar in USA (UNSTATS, 2012). 
 
After collecting the data, mathematical and graphical diagnosis were conducted to check 
whether the data satisfy the normality assumption. Normality is the most important 
characteristics of the raw data. A normally distributed observation is bell-shaped and well 
behaved which distributes the data equally in both sides of the median value. 
 
         
      π -3σ      π-2σ        π-σ        π= 0      π+ σ       π+2σ     π+3σ 
Figure 2: Standard Normal Distribution Curve (π=0, σ=1) 
 
In a normally distributed distribution mean, median and mode all are equal. In most of the 
cases 68% observations are clustered between -1σ to +1σ, 95% observation exists between -
2σ to +2σ and 99.7% observation lies between -3σ  to +3σ  in the normally distributed data. 
Thus normality assumption is an important characteristic of a data set. To find the trend the 
study has tested the data set with the help of Eviews 7 and found the following descriptive 
statistics, which show that none of them are normally distributed. Thus the data set is not 
satisfying the normality assumption.  
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Data 
Name of Variables Mean Median St. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis Jarqe-Bera Probability 
Total Cost (M 
USD) 
664.54 222.60 1557.50 6.07 42.72 4169.13 0.00 
CSS (MtCO2) 47.50 18.01 102.67 5.72 39.23 3488.83 0.00 
CDM (1=yes, 
0= Otherwise) 
0.74 1.00 0.44 -1.10 2.22 13.24 0.00 
Per Capita GDP 
(Int. dollar) 
3726.33 2153.03 3520.42 1.17 3.06 13.24 0.00 
Afforestation/ 
Reforestation 
(1000ha) 
65.77 20.00 128.86 3.65 17.38 628.00 0.00 
Deforestation 
Halted (1000 
ha) 
29.84 10.15 62.68 4.18 21.81 1023.98 0.00 
Sustainable 
Agriculture 
(1000ha) 
903.55 450.00 1713.94 4.41 25.27 1386.97 0.00 
Forest Area 
(1000 ha) 
31338.00 12067.00 68302.00 5.07 31.65 2232.00 0.00 
Note: The data statistics were calculated with the help of Eviews 7 
 
Thus we need to take the remedial measures so that the data comes at least close to the normal 
distribution. A widely used transformation method for non-normally distributed data is Box-
Cox transformation.  By the Box-Cox transformation to transform a variable Y to Y” a 
parameter λ is used while 𝑇(𝑌) =  𝑇λ−1  
λ
 where λ can take any value between -5 to +5. But a 
standard region is -1 to +1. In contrast λ=0 is simply the natural logarithmic transformation 
and λ=1 is linear transformation. Here, to transform the non-normally distributed data we used 
natural logarithmic transformation for all variables except the binary variable Clean 
Development Mechanisms (CDM). Moreover, variables taking 0 (zero) values were 
considered a minimum positive value (0.0001) to avoid mathematical errors in logarithmic 
transformation. After transformation, the data look like normally distributed though they are 
not exactly normal.  
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics after Data Transformation 
Name of Variables Mean Median St. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis Jarqe-Bera Probability 
LnTC  5.39 5.40 1.53 0.00 2.38 0.93 0.63 
LnCSS  2.83 2.89 1.49 0.01 2.39 0.90 0.64 
CDM  0.74 1.00 0.44 -1.10 2.22 13.24 0.00 
)(PPPLnGDP  7.78 7.67 0.98 0.04 2.14 1.78 0.41 
RFLnAF /  2.89 2.99 1.77 -0.15 2.43 0.98 0.61 
LnDH  2.16 2.31 1.73 -0.44 3.44 2.38 0.30 
LnSAP  5.88 6.10 1.49 -0.84 5.87 26.83 0.00 
LnFA  9.28 9.40 1.59 -0.63 4.46 8.98 0.01 
Note: LnTC  = Natural log of Total Cost, LnCSS  = Natural log of Carbon Sequestration,  
CDM = Clean Development Mechanism (1 = There exists at least one project in the country 
and 0= others), )(PPPLnGDP  = Natural log of per capita gross domestic product in 
international dollar in terms of purchasing power parity, RFLnAF /  = Natural log of 
afforestation/reforestation, LnDH = Natural log of deforestation halted, LnSAP  = Natural log 
of sustainable agricultural practice and LnFA  = Natural log of forest area. 
 
The above table shows that mean and median are very closer to each other and the skewness 
is close to zero meaning that the transformed data follows the normally distributed variable 
(not exact normal). It is also seen that variables LnSAP  (log of sustainable agricultural 
practice) and LnFA  (log of forest area) are not that much close to normally distributed 
variable. It could be the reason of small sample size. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  23 
 
 
Chapter-6: Econometric Models and Results 
 
Since carbon sequestration is a dependent variable of land use characteristics I have chosen 
the Instrumental Variable (IV) regression to estimate the cost function. In IV estimation of 
cost function carbon sequestration is considered as endogenous variable which is correlated 
with land use change variables. The instrumental variable was first introduced by Reiersøl, 
considering exact relationships in economic variables are affected by random disturbance or 
measurement errors (Sargan, 1958). This estimate is used when some variables are assumed 
to be omitted or excluded from the models which are correlated with the explanatory variables 
but unobservable. Thus it is used to obtain a consistent estimator of unknown coefficients of 
the population parameters when regressor X is correlated with the error term u (Stock and 
Watson, 2006). It is also used in case of simultaneous causality bias (where explanatory 
variable causes dependent variable and dependent variable causes explanatory variable) and 
errors in variables (Aldrich, 1993 and Gujarati, 2004). In this study, land use characteristics 
are not included in the carbon sequestration cost function which is to be estimated. That is 
some land uses characteristics (afforestation/reforestation, sustainable agricultural practice 
and deforestation halted) are excluded from the cost function though these variables have 
impact on cost function through the endogenous variable carbon sequestration. These 
variables are considered as excluded exogenous variables. This means that the exclusion 
principle of instrumental variable exists in the carbon sequestration cost function as the 
endogenous variable carbon sequestration (CSS) is functionally related to those omitted or 
excluded land use variables. In addition, it is assumed that there might be some measurement 
errors in the variables because those were collected from different sources. Thus, this study is 
conducted using the instrumental variable approach (IV regression). The properties of any 
instrumental variables are as follows, 
The instruments; Zi are exogenous that is Cov (Zi, 𝜀) = 0 but the Cov (X, Zi) ≠  0, that is they 
are correlated. Here Zi’s are ith instruments (i =1, 2, 3-----n), 𝜀 is error term and X is the 
endogenous variable in the model. If these two conditions hold then the instruments are 
considered as valid.  
 
The econometric model of the cost function is then written as, 
 
𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐶 =  𝛼1 + 𝛼2 𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑆𝑆 + 𝛼3𝐶𝐷𝑀 +   𝛼4𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃 + 𝜀---------------------------------------------(9)  
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While the LnCSS is a function of several instrumental variables and thus LnCSS can be 
expressed as,   
 
𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑆𝑆 = 𝜇1 + 𝜇2 𝑙𝑛𝐷𝐻 + 𝜇3 𝑙𝑛𝑅𝐹 + 𝜇4 𝑙𝑛𝑆𝐴𝑃 + 𝜇5𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐴 + 𝜃 -------------------------     - (10) 
 
Here 𝜀  and 𝜃 are error terms, 𝛼1 (in eq. 9) and  𝜇1 (in equation 10) are intercepts. The 
coefficients are   𝛼2 ,   𝛼3  and   𝛼4  (in equation 9) and   𝜇2  , 𝜇3  , 𝜇4   and 𝜇5  (in equation 10) 
to be estimated. 
  
Now using STATA 11 we can estimate equation (9) and (10). As the LnCSS is the function of 
instrumental variables (excluded exogenous variables), we can estimate the total cost function 
considering the instrumental variables. Here, we can instrument the variable LnCSS and 
estimate LnTC (equation 9) directly with a single equation model. While estimating equation 
(9) and (10) we use different models with variability of variables. There are two alternative 
models we have used for regression part. In each alternative equation, estimations are done 
with a variation in included exogenous variable. The only difference in two models is 
inclusion of Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM). In first case it is considered as 
excluded exogenous variable (equation 11) and in second case it is considered as included 
exogenous variable (equation 12). These models are given below. 
 
Model 1: 𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐶 =  𝛼1 + 𝛼2 𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑆𝑆 +  𝛼3 𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃; 𝑙𝑛 𝐶𝑆𝑆 =  𝜇1 + 𝜇2 𝑙𝑛𝐷𝐻 + 𝜇3 𝑙𝑛𝑅𝐹 +
𝜇4 𝑙𝑛𝑆𝐴𝑃 + 𝜇5𝐶𝐷𝑀 + 𝜇6 𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐴                     (11) 
 
Model 2: 𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐶 =  𝛼1 + 𝛼2 𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑆𝑆 +   𝛼3𝐶𝐷𝑀 +  𝛼4𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃; 𝑙𝑛 𝐶𝑆𝑆 = 𝜇1 + 𝜇2 𝑙𝑛𝐷𝐻 +
𝜇3 𝑙𝑛𝑅𝐹 + 𝜇4 𝑙𝑛𝑆𝐴𝑃 + 𝜇5 𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐴                  (12) 
 
Another model 3 is a simple Ordinary Least Square (OLS) model which will be estimated to 
compare with the other models, which is written as 
 
Model 3: 𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐶 =  𝛼1 + 𝛼2𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑆𝑆 +   𝛼3𝑙𝑛𝐷𝐻 +  𝛼4 𝑙𝑛𝑅𝐹 +  𝛼5𝑙𝑛𝑆𝐴𝑃 + 𝛼6𝐶𝐷𝑀 + 𝛼7𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃 +  𝛼8 𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐴 + 𝜀            (13) 
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Table 4: Estimated Results 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant 
 
2.133 
(0.273) 
(7.80) 
2.107 
(0.282) 
(7.46) 
2.251 
(0.362) 
(6.22) 
LnCSS  0.997* 
(0.036) 
(27.38) 
0.983* 
(0.044) 
(22.12) 
1.017* 
(0.030) 
(33.76) 
LnDH    -0.009 
(0.007) 
( -1.26) 
RFLnAF /    0.0003 
(0.009) 
(0.04) 
LnSAP    -0.358** 
0.0204 
(-1.75) 
CDM   0.053 
(0.080) 
(0.66) 
0.133 
0.0812 
(0.16) 
LnFA    0.05388 
(0.0377) 
(1.43) 
pppLnGDP  0.057 
(0.042) 
(1.37) 
0.061 
(0.043) 
(1.40) 
0.007 
(0.031) 
(0.23) 
2R  0.9822 0.9820 0.9834 
 
 
Adj 2R  0.9821 0.9814 0.9811 
F  
df  
valueFP〉  
853.38 
(2, 55) 
(0.00) 
528.89 
(3, 54) 
(0.00) 
433.00 
(7, 50) 
(0.00) 
Note: The parentheses show the robust standard errors and t/z statistics (shaded one).  
* means 5% and ** means 10% level of significance of coefficients. 
  
Table 4 shows the estimated results of the different models of the cost function. In model 1 
and 2, we have used combined/one command of instrumental variable regression approach. In 
model 1, Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM) is used as an instrumental variable of Ln of 
carbon sequestration (LnCSS) and thus it is not considered as excluded exogenous variable of 
Ln of total cost (LnTC). But in estimating model 2, Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM) 
is considered as an included exogenous variable of ditermining the Ln of total cost (LnTC). 
After regressing these two models ( model 1 and model 2) the coefficients of Ln of carbon 
sequestration supply (LnCSS) are found statistically significant at 5% level. But the 
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coefficient of Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM) and Ln of GDP (LnGDP) are not 
statistically significant at 5%  and 10% level in both models. In both models the value of  𝑅2 
is 0.98 with significant F statistics. The adjusted 𝑅2’s are also close to the unadjusted 𝑅2’s 
shown in Table 4. Though the high  𝑅2 value shows the goodness of fit of the models but few 
insignificant t statistics mean that there could be the presence of   multicollinearity in these 
two models.  
 
Model 3 shows that the coefficient of Ln of carbon sequestration (LnCSS) is significant at 5% 
level of significance and the coefficient of Ln of sustainable agricultural practice (LnSAP) is 
significant at 10% level of significance and no other variables are significant at any level 
though the coefficient of determination; 𝑅2 is sufficiently high (about 98%). It means the 
model has multicollinearity problem with high 𝑅2 and insignificant t ratios. The coefficients 
in the different models are the partial elasticity of different variables. The following graphs 
show the percentage change in total cost due to the percentage change in carbon sequestration 
(cost elasticity of carbon sequestration) in three different models estimated in this study. The 
graphs show that the cost elasticity of carbon sequestration is close to unitary in all models. 
                                                           
 
            Model 1: LnTC on LnCSS                            Model 2: LnTC on LnCSS 
            
                           Model 3: LnTC on LnCSS 
Graph 1: Cost Elasticity of Carbon Sequestration 
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6.1: Multicollinearity Test 
 
Multicollinearity among the explanatory variables is a common problem in the multiple 
regression analysis and it is alarming if there exists a linear collinearity among the variables. 
Multicollinearity means that the explanatory reggressors have collinearity to each other and as 
a result the coefficients become biased (either over estimated or under estimated from the 
actual values). In case of models 1, 2 and 3, results show that 𝑅2  is very high but there are 
few insignificant t-statistics. That is there might be multicollinearity in these models. Thus to 
avoide multicollinearity we need to check whether there is multicollinearity among the 
explanatory regressors or not. One of the most popular methods to detect multicollinearity is 
auxiliary regression. In auxilliary regression, one of the explanatory variables is regreesed on 
other explanatory variables and then compared the  𝑅2 of the auxiliary regression  with 𝑅2 of 
the main regression model. Multicollinearity will be a problem if the 𝑅2 of the auxiliary 
regression is high. Here we have checked the multicollinearity problem in model 2 only as the 
𝑅2 in both models are equal that means the variable Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM) 
might be an irrelevant variable in model 2. But the inclusion of an irrelevant variable may be 
responsible for multicollinearity, thus it is necessary to test the multicollinearity for model 2. 
So, the auxiliary regressions for model 2 are as follows, 
 
 𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑆𝑆 =  𝜆1 + 𝜆2 𝐶𝐷𝑀 + 𝜆3 𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃-------------------------------------------------------------(14) 
Table 5: Estimated Result of Auxiliary Regression of LnCSS 
Constant CDM  𝑳𝒏𝑮𝑫𝑷 2R  2AdjR  
-2.51 0.91 
(0.4) 
(2.29) 
0.60 
(0.18) 
(3.33) 
0.2830 0.267 
Note: Parenthesizes are standard deviation and t statistics (shaded) 
 
 
𝐶𝐷𝑀 =  𝜆1 + 𝜆2 𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑆𝑆 + 𝜆3 𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃-------------------------------------------------------------- (15)        
Table 6: Estimated Result of Auxiliary Regression of CDM 
Constant 𝒍𝒏𝑪𝑺𝑺 𝒍𝒏𝑮𝑫𝑷 2R  2AdjR  
-2.51 0.095 
(0.041) 
(2.29) 
0.05 
(0.06) 
(0.79) 
0.1448 0.1179 
Note: Parenthesizes are standard deviation and t statistics (shaded) 
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 𝐿𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃 =  𝜆1 + 𝜆2 𝐶𝐷𝑀 + 𝜆3 𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑆𝑆 ------------------------------------------------------------ (16) 
Table 7: Estimated Result of Auxiliary Regression of LnGDP 
Constant LnCSS  CDM  2R  2AdjR  
-2.51 0.279  
(0.084)    
(3.33) 
.223 
(0.283)    
(0.79) 
0.2235 0.1952 
Note: Parenthesizes are standard deviation and t statistics (shaded) 
 
The 𝑅2′ and Adj 𝑅2′of the auxiliary regressions (Equation 14, 15 and 16) shown in the above 
tables are very low compared with the 𝑅2′ and Adj 𝑅2′ of estimated model 2. This means that 
these models are not a good fit and thus there is no multicollinearity problem in model 2 
(Equation 12). To be sure we can check by another method Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) in 
the following. 
 
 
6.2: Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
 
Variance Inflation Factor is another widely used method of detecting multicollinearity 
problem. Another method tolerance (Tol ) level the inverse of variance inflation factor (VIF ) 
is also used alternatively for detecting multicollinearity. When there is a perfect collinearity 
among the regressors the value of tolerance is zero (0) and if there is no collinearity among 
the regressors the value of tolerance is one (1). If there is higher multicollinearity problem in 
the model the value of variance inflation factor becomes larger and it is smaller if there is no 
strong multicollinearity problem. The relation of variance inflation factor (VIF ) and tolerance 
(Tol ) can be used as interchangeably (Gujarati, 2004) as tolerance (Tol ) is equal to
VIF
1 . The 
resuts for variance inflation factor and tolerance are as follows.  
 
Table 8: Variance Inflation Factor for Model 1 
Variables  VIF  
VIF
Tol 1=  
LnCSS  1.27 0.785273 
LnGDP  1.27 0.785273 
Note: VIF = Variance Inflation Factor, Tol = Tolerance 
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Table 9: Variance Inflation Factor for Model 2 
Variables  VIF  
VIF
Tol 1=  
LnCSS  1.39 0.716984 
CDM  1.17 0.851590 
LnGDP  1.29 0.776529 
Note: VIF = Variance Inflation Factor, Tol = Tolerance 
 
 
Table 10: Variance Inflation Factor for Model 3 
Variables  VIF  
VIF
Tol 1=  
LnCSS  2.02 0.495360 
LnDH  1.35 0.740219 
RFLnAF /  1.49 0.669881 
LnSAP  1.24 0.808699 
CDM  1.30 0.771293 
LnGDP  1.42 0.705834 
LnFA  1.81 0.553915 
Note: VIF = Variance Inflation Factor, Tol = Tolerance 
 
 
Here table 8 and table 9 show that the value of tolerance is less than 1 but not zero. Though 
the tolerance values are less than 1, they are seem to be larger and closer to one. That means 
there is no strong correlation among the regressors. So, none of the models are biased with 
multicollinearity problem and hence there is no strong multicollinearity in model 1 and model 
2. On the other hand, table 10 (model 3) shows that the value of variance inflation factor for 
Ln of carbon sequestration (LnCSS), Ln of forest area (LnFA) and Ln of 
afforestation/reforestation are comparatively high (tolerance value is low).  The VIF  value for 
Ln of carbon sequestration is 2.02 means that the variance of this variable is more than twice 
of the actual variance. By the same way the variance of Ln of forest is also inflated by 1.81 
times and variance of Ln of afforestation/reforestation is inflated by 1.49 times of the actual 
ones. These variables are biased with multicollinearity. Except this for model 3, both method 
of detecting multicollinearity; auxiliary regression and variance inflation factor (VIF) give the 
same result of having no exact multicollinearity problem in model 1 and model 2. In this 
situation the insignificant t statistics with high 2R could be the reason of small sample size as 
multicollinearity is treated as a problem of sample (Gujarati, 2004).  
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6.3: Heteroskedasticity Test 
 
Homoskedasticity (constant variance) implies that the variance of error term is constant. If 
this assumption does not hold then there arises heteroskedasticity. As a result, the variance is 
no longer minimum. In the instrumental variable (IV) regression the error may increase as 
instrumental variable increases. To avoid the heteroskedasticity, we have used the robust 
standard error while regressing the equations. Irrespective of robust standard error, there are 
several approaches to test the heteroskedasticity. One important approach is to plot the fitted 
values against residuals and observe whether there is any systematic pattern. Another most 
widely used procedure is White’s General Test for heteroskedasticity. Model 1 and 2 are 
instrumented model and thus we have used robust standard error during the regression which 
are adjusted with the heteroskedasticity. Thus there is no heteroskedasticity in model 1 and 2. 
But for model 3, we checked the heteroskedasticity with White’s General Test. The test 
procedure for model 3 is as follows: 
White's test for Ho: homoskedasticity against Ha: unrestricted heteroskedasticity. 
 
Table 11: Test of Heteroskedasticity for Model 3 
2Chi  )2(Pr ChiobP 〉  df  
27.28 0.7864 34 
Note: P = Probability, df = Degrees of freedom 
         
The White’s homoskedasticity test for model 3 shows (Table 11) that there is 
heteroskedasticity in model 3. As a result, the standard errors are not homogeneous and thus 
model 3 violates the properties of Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimators. Thus the 
coefficients in model 3 are not good estimators of the population parameter of the carbon 
sequestration cost function. 
   
6.4:  Endogeneity and Over Identification Test 
 
Model 1 and 2 are regressed with single command IV regression and thus these two models 
need to satisfy the conditions of IV regression; endogeneity and over identification restriction. 
The tests are conducted as follows:   
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The model identification is an important condition for the instrumental variable regression. A 
model is said to be exactly identified if the number of instruments is equal to the number of 
endogenous variable, over identified if number of instruments is higher than the number of 
endogenous variables and under identified if the number of instruments is less than the 
number of endogenous variables. The assumptions can be tested if the model is over 
identified. The most common test for over identification restriction is Sargan test which 
consider that the residuals should be uncorrelated with the exogenous variables if the 
instruments are really exogenous. The Sargan (1958) test follows the chi-sq distribution 
which is calculated as 2NR (the number of observation is multiplied by the coefficient of 
determination). This statistic follows )( KM −   degrees of freedom under the null hypothesis 
that error term is uncorrelated with the instruments. Here M = number of instruments and K
= number of endogenous variable. 
 
Table 12: Test of Over Identification Restriction 
Model Sargan N*𝑹𝟐 test(Chi-sq) P-value Basmann test (Chi-sq) P-value 
Model 1 3.43(4) 0.49 3.2(4) 0.52 
Model 2 2.86(3) 0.41 2.65(3) 0.45 
Note: degrees of freedom in Parenthesize 
 
The results show that the null hypothesis of over identification is uncorrelated with the 
instruments, what cannot be rejected. That is the models are over identified. 
 
The test of endogeneity refers to the fact that all the instruments are uncorrelated with error 
term but correlated with endogenous variable. Here the endogeneity test for the models are 
done by Wu-Husman F test and Durbin-Wu-Husman Chi-sq test considering the null 
hypothesis 
 H0 = Regressor’s are exogenous and alternative hypothesis; H1= Regressor’s are 
endogenous. The result of the test is shown in the following table: 
 
Table 13: Test of Endogeneity 
Model Wu-Husman F test P-value Durbin –Wu-Husman Chi-sq test P-value 
Model 1 0.22 (1, 54) 0.64 0.23 (1) 0.63 
Model 2 0.50 (1, 53) 0.48 0.54 (1) 0.46 
Note: Parenthesizes are degrees of freedom 
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The table shows that the results of both tests (Wu-Husman F test and Durbin-Wu-Husman 
Chi-sq test) are almost equal for both models with higher p-values. So, both forms of test 
show that estimating the equation with non linear regression (log-log) gives consistent results. 
Thus we cannot reject the null hypothesis of regressor’s   exogeneity. That is there is no 
endogeneity problem in the models.  
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Chapter-7: Discussion and Comparison of Results 
 
Considering the estimated results from different regressions and tests in chapter six, we can 
conclude that model 1 and 2 are better models in this study. That is the instrumental variable 
(IV) regression is better than the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression. The reasons why 
the instrumental variable regression is better than the OLS estimator are, i) there is no 
multicollinearity and heteroskedasticity in instrumental variable regressions. Though there are 
few insignificant t statistics with high 𝑅2 values show possibility of multicollinearity but the 
tests of auxiliary regression and VIF nullified the presence of multicollinearity; ii) the 
instrumental variable regressions are over identified and there is no endogeneity problem in 
these two models. As a result, these two instrumental variable regression models satisfy the 
properties of instrumental variable regression. On the other hand, the OLS estimator model 3 
has multicollinearity problem in few variables. The variances of those variables are inflated 
over the actual variance; moreover model 3 has significant level of heteroskedasticity. Thus 
the instrumental variable regression models (model 1 and model 2) are suitable model for this 
study. 
In order to make a comparison of the estimated results with other studies we differentiate the 
total cost function with respect to carbon sequestration to get the marginal cost. Using the 
estimated coefficient of Ln of carbon sequestration (LnCSS) from model 1, the calculated 
marginal cost as a function of carbon sequestration (CSS) is  $13.30 and in model 2 it is 
$13.11 (Appendix E) remaining other things constant.  We know the profit maximizing 
necessary condition is, 
Marginal Cost (MC) = Marginal Revenue (MR) 
But in a competitive market marginal revenue is equal to the price.  
So, Marginal Cost (MC) = Price (P). 
Thus equating marginal cost with price the estimation gives the price of per ton of sequestered 
carbon is $13.30 (model 1).  Interestingly, we did not find any guideline in the Kyoto Protocol 
about the price and market structure of the carbon trading. Rather it emphasized on cost 
efficient carbon reduction by Annex I countries in Non-Annex I countries. As a result, no 
strong market behavior is observed in the carbon market; especially for price mechanism. 
Generally, the higher price of carbon can enhance more carbon sequestration as price change 
is expected to change the behavior of landowners (Bowen, 2011). That condition will lead 
carbon sequestrated countries can gain by the carbon trading. But the global carbon price is 
  34 
 
 
very low comparing with the abatement cost of the carbon reduction by the Annex I countries 
(Table 14) which is the shadow price. Ellerman et al. (1998) have calculated this shadow 
price equating the last ton of carbon abated (marginal cost) in absence of emission trading in 
those regions.  
 
Table 14: Abatement Costs of Developed Countries 
Country Abatement Cost/$t 2Co  
Japan $584 
EEC(12 Countries) $273 
OOE $223 
USA $186 
 Notes: EEC = European Union, OOE = Other OECD Countries, USA = United States of 
America, Source:   Ellerman et al., 1998 
 
 
Thus the lower price of carbon resembles the lower benefits to the carbon sequestration 
supplier countries and in turns the lower supply of carbon sequestration. The price for carbon 
needs to be fixed in such a way that it resembles the marginal costs or marginal damages, 
while marginal damage is refers as the marginal social costs. Thus it is difficult to estimate 
because of uncertainties, such as future damages of atmosphere, warming and sea level rise 
(Bowen, 2011). In this regard, the policymakers need to be careful about the marginal social 
costs of carbon as it will determine the price of carbon. But it is clear that the carbon trading 
through carbon sequestration decreases the cost of emission reduction.  
 
Here the calculated result shows the present market scenarios observed in 2009. According to 
State and Trend of Carbon Market Report of World Bank the carbon price in EUA (European 
Union Allowance) plummeted to €8 (US$ 11.7) in February 2009 and in May it ranges from 
€13 to € 16 (US$ 17 to US$ 22) (Kossy and Ambroisy, 2010). Diaz et al. (2010) reported that 
in Chicago Carbon Exchange Market the exchange price was $7.0/t 2CO e in May 2008 and it 
declined to $0.1/t 2CO e in 2009. On the other hand, the UK Committee on Climate Change 
has projected per ton of carbon price is $47.79 (£30) in 2020 and $111.52 (£70) in 2030 
(Bowen, 2011) in terms of US$ 2005. Thus the result estimated in this study is consistent with 
the present scenario of the carbon market. Irrespective of the price and market mechanism, 
still the carbon sequestration is profitable but with a proper market mechanism it could be a 
more profitable sector of land use in developing countries. It will then benefit the developing 
countries through foreign earnings and reduce the cost of carbon reduction of developed 
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countries. At the same time global carbon reduction target could be achieved by this cost 
effective measure.  
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Chapter-8: Conclusion 
 
This study has found that the percentage change of carbon sequestration cost due to the 
percentage change in carbon sequestration is close to unitary. That is the elasticity of carbon 
sequestration cost is almost unitary and linear. In this case the marginal cost of carbon 
sequestration is equal to the average cost of carbon sequestration. As the average cost and 
marginal costs are equal the production function is constant returns to scale. Constant return 
to scale refers that the output changes is proportional to the change in inputs. The reason for 
unitary elasticity of carbon sequestration cost might be for constant returns to scale of carbon 
sequestration. Though initial cost of conversion of land and plantation is high, the cost 
decreases while the length of time increases and finally the sequestration depends only on the 
maintenance costs of carbon sequestration. The marginal cost and price calculated (Chapter 7: 
Appendix E) in this study from cost function shows that the price represents the present 
market scenario. The estimated marginal cost of carbon sequestration is very low comparing 
the abatement costs of developed countries (Annex I) meaning that carbon sequestration is a 
cost effective way to reduce carbon emission. Thus this can reduce global costs of emission 
reduction and increase earnings for developing countries 
 
On the other hand, this study has some shortcomings like the unavailability of data. The data 
on the price of sequestrated carbon was the major shortcomings of this study. In addition, 
unavailability of updated data on carbon sequestration from a singular unified source and 
small size of sample among others are some shortcomings of this study. Hence this study 
could not estimate the derived demand function or derived supply function of carbon 
sequestration because of unavailability of data on price of carbon sequestration though the 
theoretical background was started with the profit maximizing behavior of the land owners. 
This is why we have estimated the carbon sequestration cost function. But the matter of hope 
is that, the carbon sequestration data is not rich enough globally as it is a new phenomenon in 
the global economy. Despite of these limitations, this study gives a cost scenario which could 
be helpful for further research and policy matters. Irrespective of some shortcomings this 
study seeks to estimate the carbon sequestration cost function for developing countries which 
may be helpful to the global policymakers for emission reduction through carbon 
sequestration as an effective measure. 
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This study revealed that the price of carbon needs to be a bit higher as a regulated price. In the 
regulated price it could be higher than the marginal cost of sequestration. UNFCCC can play a 
vital role in fixing the regulated price so that both parties (Annex I and Non-Annex I 
countries) could gain from the carbon sequestration in terms of equity. In addition to 
regulated price, the Annex I countries can contribute building social infrastructure in Non-
Annex countries to improve the livelihood as compensation. 
 
The global concern for emission reduction increases the demand for carbon sequestration. 
Thus project based carbon sequestration is increasing in tropical developing countries as it is a 
cost effective way of emission reduction among others. Especially, carbon sequestration 
reduces the cost of emission reduction for developed countries (Annex I countries) more 
sharply than their abatement cost. Simultaneously, it has opened an opportunity for Non-
Annex I countries to earn foreign remittance by employing some of their land in carbon 
sequestration projects. Estimating the carbon sequestration cost function this study found that 
the carbon sequestration is a constant return to scale. This finding means that the carbon 
sequestration is a profitable source of land uses in developing countries, i.e. Non-Annex I 
countries. Once again, this study identified the three fold benefits of carbon sequestration, 
which may help to meet the global emission reduction target. 
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Appendices  
 
Appendix A: List of Countries in Sampling 
 
Afghanistan, Argentina, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina 
Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameron, Central African Rep, Chile, Chad, China, Colombia, 
Costa Richa, Cote dÍvoire, Dem. Rep.Congo, Dominucan Rep, Ecuador, Ethopia, Guatemala, 
Guyana, Honduras , India, Indonesia, Kenya, Laos, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, 
Mozambique, Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, 
Papua New Guinea, Paraguaya, Peru, Philipines, Senegal, South Africa Sudan, Srilanka, 
Tanzania, Thailand, Uganda, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
 
 
Appendix B: Average Unit Cost of carbon sequestration missing in the Forest Carbon Index 
(2009) were considered as the average of the neighboring countries/ equivalent to some 
neighboring countries as follows:  
Target Country Consideration Target Country Consideration 
Vietnam, China Equivalent to Laos India Average of Pakistan, 
China, Nepal and  
Bangladesh 
Morocco Average of Mali, 
Chad, Senegal and 
Benin 
Sri Lanka Average of India, 
Myanmar, Thailand and 
Malaysia 
Ivory Cost, Niger, 
South Africa 
Average of 
Namibia, 
Zimbabwe and 
Botswana 
 
Thailand Average of Vietnam, 
Indonesia, Laos 
Chile Average of Brazil, 
Bolivia, Mexico 
and Paraguay   
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Appendix C 
Carbon Sequestration data for following countries were collected from Devney et al. (FCI, 
2009): Afghanistan, Argentina, Burundi, Cambodia, Chile, Dominican Rep, Morocco and 
Nepal 
 
Appendix D 
Afforestation/Reforestation data for the following countries were collected from FAO Forest 
data: Afghanistan, Argentina, Burundi, Cambodia, Chile, Dominican Rep, Morocco, Nepal, 
Pakistan and Sri Lanka  
 
 
Appendix E: Calculating Marginal Cost (Model 1) 
 ln (𝑇𝐶) = 𝛼1 + 𝛼2 ln (𝐶𝑆𝑆) + 𝛼3ln (𝐺𝐷𝑃) 
⇒
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Since     
)(
)(
CSS
TC
∂
∂ =MC     and           
CSS
TC =AC 
MC=  AC 2 ×α  = 𝑓(𝐶𝑆𝑆) = 𝑓(𝐶𝑆𝑆) 
Thus, 𝑀𝐶 = 𝛼2 ∗ 𝐴𝐶     
⇒𝑀𝐶 = 0.997 ∗ 𝐴𝐶      
⇒𝑀𝐶 = (0.997 ∗ 13.34)    (Assumption: Putting AC = Mean of AC) 
⇒ 𝑀𝐶 = $ 13.30  
 
Calculating Marginal Cost (Model2) 
𝑀𝐶 = 𝛼2 ∗ 𝐴𝐶     
⇒𝑀𝐶 = 0.983 ∗ 𝐴𝐶      
⇒𝑀𝐶 = (0.983 ∗ 13.34)    
⇒ 𝑀𝐶 = $ 13.11  
